@Plumed_serpent
@我思_先于本质
@超越查拉图

半年没看理想国了，里面的论证有点忘了。不过我觉得你应该遗漏了一些东西，但我想不起来了。你再仔细看看这个论证的结构是什么，就是关于有知与无知面对别人时的情况的区别。至于你的问题是，这样两个分裂的事情如何能形成有效的类比？确实是个问题，这是柏拉图对话录的特点，苏格拉底引导人思考问题总是在迁移问题，不谈问题本身而换几个相似的类比问题来谈。现在你提到的这个类比有没有合法性，我觉得是有，这得和当时希腊人的伦理观念结合起来看。色拉马霍叙斯那么精明，为什么对苏格拉底这种类比毫无质疑？（质疑也只是从外部质疑，说什么真正的强者没你说的那么差）这就是他本人也承认苏格拉底的预设：正义、智慧本身是紧密相关的。在苏格拉底时期，说一个正义的人是无知的，说一个愚蠢的人是正义的是不可理解的。人是作为一个伦理上的整体人格被理解的。（你看看当时的戏剧，一般称颂一个人“正义”都和说他“智慧”一起说）所以这种类比是很有效的，以至于精明的色拉马霍叙斯也不会提出异议。后来第三卷（好像是？）提出人——城邦结构的类比（先看看城邦的正义结构，证明正义的优越性，类比到人身上），你说有没有合法性？按你的质疑思路，这种类比还是奇怪。但两个和苏格拉底对话的人不仅没觉得奇怪还认为终于找到了好路。这也可以看出希腊人习惯于预设这种比较整体的伦理观的。

Socrates - GLAUCON - THRASYMACHUS
Yes, that is what I say, and I have given you my reasons.
And what is your view about them? Would you call one of them virtue and the other vice?
Certainly.
I suppose that you would call justice virtue and injustice vice?
What a charming notion! So likely too, seeing that I affirm injustice to be profitable and justice not.
What else then would you say?
The opposite, he replied.
And would you call justice vice?
No, I would rather say sublime simplicity.
Then would you call injustice malignity?
No; I would rather say discretion.
And do the unjust appear to you to be wise and good?
Yes, he said; at any rate those of them who are able to be perfectly unjust, and who have the power of subduing states and nations; but perhaps you imagine me to be talking of cutpurses.
Even this profession if undetected has advantages, though they are not to be compared with those of which I was just now speaking.
I do not think that I misapprehend your meaning, Thrasymachus, I replied; but still I cannot hear without amazement that you class injustice with wisdom and virtue, and justice with the opposite.
Certainly I do so class them.
Now, I said, you are on more substantial and almost unanswerable ground; for if the injustice which you were maintaining to be profitable had been admitted by you as by others to be vice and deformity, an answer might have been given to you on received principles; but now I perceive that you will call injustice honourable and strong, and to the unjust you will attribute all the qualities which were attributed by us before to the just, seeing that you do not hesitate to rank injustice with wisdom and virtue.
You have guessed most infallibly, he replied.
Then I certainly ought not to shrink from going through with the argument so long as I have reason to think that you, Thrasymachus, are speaking your real mind; for I do believe that you are now in earnest and are not amusing yourself at our expense.
I may be in earnest or not, but what is that to you? --to refute the argument is your business.
Very true, I said; that is what I have to do: But will you be so good as answer yet one more question? Does the just man try to gain any advantage over the just?
Far otherwise; if he did would not be the simple, amusing creature which he is.
And would he try to go beyond just action?
He would not.
And how would he regard the attempt to gain an advantage over the unjust; would that be considered by him as just or unjust?
He would think it just, and would try to gain the advantage; but he would not be able.
Whether he would or would not be able, I said, is not to the point. My question is only whether the just man, while refusing to have more than another just man, would wish and claim to have more than the unjust?
Yes, he would.
And what of the unjust --does he claim to have more than the just man and to do more than is just
Of course, he said, for he claims to have more than all men.
And the unjust man will strive and struggle to obtain more than the unjust man or action, in order that he may have more than all?
True.
We may put the matter thus, I said --the just does not desire more than his like but more than his unlike, whereas the unjust desires more than both his like and his unlike?
Nothing, he said, can be better than that statement.
And the unjust is good and wise, and the just is neither?
Good again, he said.
And is not the unjust like the wise and good and the just unlike them?
Of course, he said, he who is of a certain nature, is like those who are of a certain nature; he who is not, not.
Each of them, I said, is such as his like is?
Certainly, he replied.
Very good, Thrasymachus, I said; and now to take the case of the arts: you would admit that one man is a musician and another not a musician?
Yes.
And which is wise and which is foolish?
Clearly the musician is wise, and he who is not a musician is foolish.
And he is good in as far as he is wise, and bad in as far as he is foolish?
Yes.
And you would say the same sort of thing of the physician?
Yes.
And do you think, my excellent friend, that a musician when he adjusts the lyre would desire or claim to exceed or go beyond a musician in the tightening and loosening the strings?
I do not think that he would.
But he would claim to exceed the non-musician?
Of course.
And what would you say of the physician? In prescribing meats and drinks would he wish to go beyond another physician or beyond the practice of medicine?
He would not.
But he would wish to go beyond the non-physician?
Yes.
And about knowledge and ignorance in general; see whether you think that any man who has knowledge ever would wish to have the choice of saying or doing more than another man who has knowledge. Would he not rather say or do the same as his like in the same case?
That, I suppose, can hardly be denied.
And what of the ignorant? would he not desire to have more than either the knowing or the ignorant?
I dare say.
And the knowing is wise?
Yes.
And the wise is good?
True.
Then the wise and good will not desire to gain more than his like, but more than his unlike and opposite?
I suppose so.
Whereas the bad and ignorant will desire to gain more than both?
Yes.
But did we not say, Thrasymachus, that the unjust goes beyond both his like and unlike? Were not these your words? They were.
They were.
And you also said that the lust will not go beyond his like but his unlike?
Yes.
Then the just is like the wise and good, and the unjust like the evil and ignorant?
That is the inference.
And each of them is such as his like is?
That was admitted.
Then the just has turned out to be wise and good and the unjust evil and ignorant.
Thrasymachus made all these admissions, not fluently, as I repeat them, but with extreme reluctance; it was a hot summer's day, and the perspiration poured from him in torrents; and then I saw what I had never seen before, Thrasymachus blushing. As we were now agreed that justice was virtue and wisdom, and injustice vice and ignorance, I proceeded to another point....

这是另一个译本的
[350a]
（Does a Phycisian) In prescribing food and drink would he want to outdo the medical man or the medical procedure?”
“Surely not.”
“But he would the unmedical man?”
“Yes.”
“Consider then with regard to all1 forms of knowledge and ignorance whether you think that anyone who knows would choose to do or say other or more than what another who knows would do or say, and not rather exactly what his like would do in the same action.”
“Why, perhaps it must be so,” he said, “in such cases.” “But what of the ignorant man—of him who does not know? Would he not overreach or outdo equally?"
[350b] the knower and the ignorant?” “It may be.” “But the one who knows is wise?” “I'll say so.” “And the wise is good?” “I'll say so.” “Then he who is good and wise will not wish to overreach his like but his unlike and opposite.” “It seems so,” he said. “But the bad man and the ignoramus will overreach both like and unlike?” “So it appears.” “And does not our unjust man, Thrasymachus, overreach both unlike and like? Did you not say that?” “I did,” he replied.
[350c] “But the just man will not overreach his like but only his unlike?” “Yes.” “Then the just man is like the wise and good, and the unjust is like the bad and the ignoramus.” “It seems likely.” “But furthermore we agreed that such is each as that to which he is like.” “Yes, we did.” “Then the just man has turned out1 on our hands to be good and wise and the unjust man bad and ignorant.”
Thrasymachus made all these admissions
[350d] not as I now lightly narrate them, but with much baulking and reluctance1 and prodigious sweating, it being summer, and it was then I beheld what I had never seen before—Thrasymachus blushing.2 But when we did reach our conclusion that justice is virtue and wisdom and injustice vice and ignorance, “Good,” said I, “let this be taken as established.3 But we were also affirming that injustice is a strong and potent thing. Don't you remember, Thrasymachus?” “I remember,” he said; “but I don't agree with what you are now saying either and I have an answer to it,

还有问题就是在色拉马霍叙斯提出苏格拉底没把牧羊人养羊的理由是为了杀羊肉剪羊毛赚钱，苏格拉底提出每个手艺人做手艺都实际上不直接得到报酬，比如医术得到的不是钱或自己的其他利益而是病人的健康，而自己的利益是从一门“art of payment"在之后得到的，这个是什么意思？
http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.2.i.html
Heaven forbid! I said; I would only ask you to be consistent; or, if you change, change openly and let there be no deception. For I must remark, Thrasymachus, if you will recall what was previously said, that although you began by defining the true physician in an exact sense, you did not observe a like exactness when speaking of the shepherd; you thought that the shepherd as a shepherd tends the sheep not with a view to their own good, but like a mere diner or banqueter with a view to the pleasures of the table; or, again, as a trader for sale in the market, and not as a shepherd. Yet surely the art of the shepherd is concerned only with the good of his subjects; he has only to provide the best for them, since the perfection of the art is already ensured whenever all the requirements of it are satisfied. And that was what I was saying just now about the ruler. I conceived that the art of the ruler, considered as ruler, whether in a state or in private life, could only regard the good of his flock or subjects; whereas you seem to think that the rulers in states, that is to say, the true rulers, like being in authority.
Think! Nay, I am sure of it.
Then why in the case of lesser offices do men never take them willingly without payment, unless under the idea that they govern for the advantage not of themselves but of others? Let me ask you a question: Are not the several arts different, by reason of their each having a separate function? And, my dear illustrious friend, do say what you think, that we may make a little progress.
Yes, that is the difference, he replied.
And each art gives us a particular good and not merely a general one --medicine, for example, gives us health; navigation, safety at sea, and so on?
Yes, he said.
And the art of payment has the special function of giving pay: but we do not confuse this with other arts, any more than the art of the pilot is to be confused with the art of medicine, because the health of the pilot may be improved by a sea voyage. You would not be inclined to say, would you, that navigation is the art of medicine, at least if we are to adopt your exact use of language?
Certainly not.
Or because a man is in good health when he receives pay you would not say that the art of payment is medicine?
I should say not.
Nor would you say that medicine is the art of receiving pay because a man takes fees when he is engaged in healing?
Certainly not.
And we have admitted, I said, that the good of each art is specially confined to the art?
Yes.
Then, if there be any good which all artists have in common, that is to be attributed to something of which they all have the common use?
True, he replied.
And when the artist is benefited by receiving pay the advantage is gained by an additional use of the art of pay, which is not the art professed by him?
He gave a reluctant assent to this.
Then the pay is not derived by the several artists from their respective arts. But the truth is, that while the art of medicine gives health, and the art of the builder builds a house, another art attends them which is the art of pay. The various arts may be doing their own business and benefiting that over which they preside, but would the artist receive any benefit from his art unless he were paid as well?
I suppose not.
But does he therefore confer no benefit when he works for nothing?
Certainly, he confers a benefit.
Then now, Thrasymachus, there is no longer any doubt that neither arts nor governments provide for their own interests; but, as we were before saying, they rule and provide for the interests of their subjects who are the weaker and not the stronger --to their good they attend and not to the good of the superior.
And this is the reason, my dear Thrasymachus, why, as I was just now saying, no one is willing to govern; because no one likes to take in hand the reformation of evils which are not his concern without remuneration. For, in the execution of his work, and in giving his orders to another, the true artist does not regard his own interest, but always that of his subjects; and therefore in order that rulers may be willing to rule, they must be paid in one of three modes of payment: money, or honour, or a penalty for refusing.

那个时候，“知识即美德”呀！

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Definition:
无知: is a quality which claims to "have more than either the knowing or the ignorant."
贤能: is a quality which does not claim to have knowledge over those of his same kind (wise-kind), but have more than those who are not (ignorant-kind). See the examples of Physician and Non-Physician etc. etc."And about knowledge and ignorance in general; see whether you think that any man who has knowledge ever would wish to have the choice of saying or doing more than another man who has knowledge. Would he not rather say or do the same as his like in the same case?""That, I suppose, can hardly be denied. "
正义: is a quality or type of action "while refusing to have more than another just man, would wish and claim to have more than the unjust." (use search function)
不正义, Unjust actions: is a quality of type of action that makes a person" strive and struggle to obtain more than both the unjust man and just man, in order that he may have more than all."
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Argument:
无知的 desires to "have more than either the knowing or the ignorant," 或者说他有性质X"desire more than both his like and his unlike /"goes beyond both his like and unlike;"
不正义的 desires to "obtain more than the unjust man and just, in order that he may have more than all," 或者他有性质X "desire more than both his like and his unlike /"goes beyond both his like and unlike;"
无知 is vice;
所以这个性质X to "desire more than both his like and his unlike /"goes beyond both his like and unlike;"is vice;
所以不正义 is vice.
基本上就是不正义（绝对的独裁，暴政，强弱不顾都要剥削和奴役）=性质X=无知；无知=恶；所以不正义=恶这个感觉。
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我的问题是这两个：
他是怎么从某物和某物的性质相同得出两物相同的？比如我说热是火的性质也是开水的性质，但是火不能等于开水吧？
还有就是这里"desire more than both his like and his unlike /"goes beyond both his like and unlike;"具体是什么意思？指的是要在言论和选择上/政治上更有权威，或者是去侵害，剥夺，抢夺他人的权利，或者是假装去知道更多的东西。/

类比最重要的作用就是帮助理解。类比得到的结果是暂时性的、可能性的。柏拉图时期还没有出向较为严密的逻辑。